Western Washington University

Western CEDAR
Physics & Astronomy

College of Science and Engineering

12-4-2020

Designing research-based instructional materials that leverage
dual-process theories of reasoning: Insights from testing one
specific, theory-driven intervention
Mila Kryjevskaia
MacKenzie R. Stetzer
Beth A. Lindsey
Alistair McInerny
Western Washington University

Paula R. L. Heron

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://cedar.wwu.edu/physicsastronomy_facpubs
Part of the Physics Commons, and the Science and Mathematics Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Kryjevskaia, M.; Stetzer, M. R.; Lindsey, B. A.; McInerny, A.; Heron, P. R. L.; Boudreaux, A. Designing
Research-Based Instructional Materials That Leverage Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning: Insights from
Testing One Specific, Theory-Driven Intervention. Phys. Rev. Phys. Educ. Res. 2020, 16 (2), 20140, DOI:
10.1103/PhysRevPhysEducRes.16.020140

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Science and Engineering at Western
CEDAR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Physics & Astronomy by an authorized administrator of Western
CEDAR. For more information, please contact westerncedar@wwu.edu.

Authors
Mila Kryjevskaia, MacKenzie R. Stetzer, Beth A. Lindsey, Alistair McInerny, Paula R. L. Heron, and Andrew
Boudreaux

This article is available at Western CEDAR: https://cedar.wwu.edu/physicsastronomy_facpubs/40

PHYSICAL REVIEW PHYSICS EDUCATION RESEARCH 16, 020140 (2020)

Designing research-based instructional materials that leverage dual-process theories
of reasoning: Insights from testing one specific, theory-driven intervention
Mila Kryjevskaia*
Department of Physics, North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota, 58102, USA

MacKenzie R. Stetzer
Department of Physics and Astronomy & Maine Center for Research in STEM Education,
University of Maine, Orono, Maine 04469, USA

Beth A. Lindsey
Physics, Penn State Greater Allegheny, McKeesport, Pennsylvania 15132, USA

Alistair McInerny
Department of Physics, North Dakota State University, Fargo, North Dakota, 58102, USA

Paula R. L. Heron
Department of Physics, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195, USA

Andrew Boudreaux
Department of Physics, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington 98225, USA
(Received 6 July 2019; accepted 24 February 2020; published 4 December 2020)
[This paper is part of the Focused Collection on Curriculum Development: Theory into Design.] Research in
physics education has contributed substantively to improvements in the learning and teaching of university
physics by informing the development of research-based instructional materials for physics courses. Reports on
the design of these materials have tended to focus on overall improvements in student performance, while the
role of theory in informing the development, refinement, and assessment of the materials is often not clearly
articulated. In this article, we illustrate how dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making have guided
the ongoing development, testing, and analysis of an instructional intervention, implemented at three different
institutions, designed to build consistency in student reasoning about the application of Newton’s 2nd law to
objects at rest. By employing constructs from cognitive science associated with dual-process theories of
reasoning (such as mindware and cognitive reflection), we were able not only to examine the overall
improvement in student performance but also to investigate the impact of the intervention on two aspects of
productive reasoning—mindware and cognitive reflection. Our analysis showed that the intervention
strengthened students’ mindware such that students were able to apply it as a criterion while checking the
validity of their intuitive responses. Moreover, logistic regression revealed that the success of our intervention
was mediated by the students’ cognitive reflection skills. Indeed, for students with comparable mindware, those
who demonstrated a weaker tendency toward cognitive reflection were less likely to initiate conflict detection
and therefore never had the opportunity to utilize their mindware. We believe that this kind of integrated, theorydriven approach to intervention design and testing represents an important first step in efforts to both account
for and leverage domain-general reasoning phenomena in the learning and teaching of physics.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevPhysEducRes.16.020140

I. INTRODUCTION
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Over the past several decades, research in physics
education has contributed to improvements in the learning
and teaching of physics by serving as a guide for the
development of instructional materials for undergraduate
physics courses. Many such research-based curricula have
been successfully designed, tested, refined, and adopted
nationally and internationally [1–8]. Findings from ongoing

020140-1

Published by the American Physical Society

MILA KRYJEVSKAIA et al.

PHYS. REV. PHYS. EDUC. RES. 16, 020140 (2020)

research on the effectiveness of these materials continue to
reveal impressive learning gains [9–11], even at sites other
than the developers’ institutions [12–16]. While the details of
the development process for these materials are often
discussed in the literature, the focus is generally on improvements in overall student performance. In many articles, the
theoretical basis for the development is not clearly articulated. As the goals and approaches of research-based
curriculum development become increasingly diverse and
nuanced, there is a need for detailed descriptions of how
decisions about specific instructional interventions are made,
as well as of how the developers’ underlying theoretical
commitments inform the research and assessment efforts that
guide the development of their materials.
In this article, we illustrate the ways in which one
particular collection of theoretical frameworks, dual-process
theories of reasoning and decision making, have informed
the ongoing development, testing, and analysis of a single
instructional intervention. The intervention focuses on
Newton’s 2nd law and has been implemented in introductory
calculus-based physics courses at three different institutions
serving a broad spectrum of students. We foreground the
tight connections among theory, intervention design, and
assessment. Given the multiple, interrelated learning goals of
the intervention, we believe that our process and findings
will be of interest to others involved in the design of theorydriven instructional materials as well.
Our curriculum development work has been in direct
response to a phenomenon observed by many physics
instructors: students often reason inconsistently on questions
targeting the same physics concept in somewhat different
contexts. Such reasoning inconsistencies have been documented in the literature, and may stem from a variety of
factors [17–22]. While some of the observed inconsistencies
may arise from a lack of a conceptual understanding, we
have been deeply interested in those inconsistencies exhibited by students who otherwise appear to demonstrate a
conceptual understanding of a particular topic.
In our prior research, we developed and administered
pairs of questions with different surface features but the
same underlying conceptual structure. Physics experts
quickly recognize that both questions can be answered
with the same reasoning approach. In practice, the first
question in the sequence requires a relatively straightforward application of one or more key physics principles,
whereas the second question is presented in a slightly
different context and has been empirically shown to elicit
strongly held, intuitively appealing, incorrect responses.
While students tend to reason correctly on the first
question, many seem to abandon this correct line of
reasoning on the second question. Students instead seem
to either draw upon intuitive ideas or apply formal knowledge incorrectly in an attempt to justify an intuitively
appealing answer. Thus, for many students, domain-general
reasoning phenomena appear to inhibit the correct use of

the relevant (and already demonstrated) knowledge and
skills on that second question.
Researchers in physics education have increasingly
turned to findings and models from cognitive science in
order to gain insight into such reasoning phenomena
[17,18]. In particular, dual-process theories of reasoning
and decision making have been used by researchers to
explain, in a mechanistic fashion, reasoning inconsistencies
similar to those described above. Such theories model
human cognition as two interacting, but largely distinct
processes: a fast, automatic, subconscious process (process
1, sometimes referred to as the heuristic process); and a
slow, analytical, effortful process (process 2, sometimes
referred to as the analytic process) [23,24]. Leveraging
these theories, researchers have recognized that productive
reasoning relies upon both relevant knowledge of the rules
and concepts needed to reason through a given problem
(sometimes referred to as mindware) and the ability to
mediate intuitive thinking by reasoning more analytically
(sometimes referred to as cognitive reflection) [25,26].
In this paper, we describe the development of a three-stage
instructional intervention guided by dual-process theories of
reasoning (DPTOR) and the associated constructs of mindware and cognitive reflection. We articulate the role of theory
in guiding the design of the intervention as well as the
collection, analysis, and interpretation of assessment data
before, during, and after instruction. We describe the theorydriven approach we have taken in three distinct phases of the
project. In phase 1, we disentangled, to the extent possible,
the contributions of mindware and cognitive reflection skills
to productive reasoning on one particular physics question.
In phase 2, we designed an intervention sequence that
supports both the development of relevant mindware and
the engagement of cognitive reflection skills. In phase 3, we
used assessment data to not only examine the overall
improvement in student performance but also to pinpoint
the impact of the intervention on each aspect of productive
reasoning (i.e., mindware and cognitive reflection).
The structure of the paper broadly follows the three
overarching phases of our project. Section II of this manuscript provides motivation for the current work and an
overview of dual-process theories of reasoning and
decision-making, mindware, and cognitive reflection.
Sections III–V describe the methodology, data collection,
and analysis associated with phases 1, 2, and 3, respectively,
at one institution. In Sec. VI, we explore the reproducibility
of our results by testing the intervention with two additional
populations of students, thereby helping us to articulate
somewhat broader implications for curriculum development
in Sec. VII. Finally, Sec. VIII summarizes our conclusions.
II. MOTIVATION AND THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS
The reasoning inconsistencies highlighted in the introduction are likely familiar to instructors at all levels and
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constitute an important phenomenon to address. In this
section, we provide an overview of relevant theoretical
frameworks and constructs from cognitive science that we
employed in our investigation of the development of an
instructional intervention aimed at helping students build
coherence in their reasoning.
A. Inconsistencies in student reasoning
To investigate inconsistencies in student reasoning, we
have developed and administered several question pairs,
including the one shown in Fig. 1. In question 1, the block
question, a thin, massless rod is glued to a heavy block at
rest on a table. Students are told that the weight of the block
is 50 N and that the table is exerting a 30 N force on the
block. Students are asked to determine the direction of the
force the rod exerts on the block, and to explain their
reasoning. By applying Newton’s 2nd law, Fnet ¼ 0 for the
block, students can conclude that the rod exerts an upward
force of 20 N. Students typically do well on this question
with the majority of students giving a correct answer with
correct reasoning. (A more detailed discussion of results is
found in Sec. III.)
We regard success on the block question as an indicator
that a student knows how to apply Newton’s 2nd law for an
object in the at-rest condition, and thus refer to it as a
screening question [18]. Question 2, the magnet question,
requires that students apply the same underlying reasoning
in a situation with more complex surface features that tend
to elicit intuitively appealing, incorrect responses. (We thus
refer to question 2 as a target question.) In question 2, a
magnet weighing 10 N remains at rest on the side of a
refrigerator while a hand exerts an upward force of 6 N.
Students are asked to determine the direction of the friction
force exerted on the magnet. A physics expert will
recognize the magnet question as analogous to the block
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question; because the magnet remains at rest, the net force
on it must be zero, and thus the friction force is upward
since the vertical component of the net force is necessarily
zero. Student performance on the magnet question, however, is typically much lower.
Of the students who answer the block question correctly,
only about one-third answer the target question correctly.
Many students who correctly apply relevant concepts on
the block question do not seem to apply the same reasoning
on the target question.
Several interpretations for the inconsistencies in student
responses on the two questions may emerge. The target
question, by design, does not look similar to the screening
question and involves vertical forces that differ in nature
(i.e., frictional force between the magnet and the fridge vs
force by the rod). Moreover, the target question contains
distracting features (i.e., magnetic and normal forces
between the magnet and the surface of the fridge) that
are irrelevant to the analysis of the forces acting in the
vertical direction. As such, one may argue that student
performance on the target question will necessarily be
worse than that on the screening. While we agree that worse
performance on the target question may not be surprising,
the overarching goal of our research is to pinpoint, understand, and address mechanisms contributing to student
reasoning difficulties in the presence of correct formal
knowledge from instruction. To explain the inconsistency,
one may argue that students in the introductory mechanics
course do not yet understand the nature of magnetic forces
typically covered in the second semester of the introductory
sequence. As a result, they would not be able to apply
Newton’s 2nd law in this situation correctly. Careful
analysis of student written responses to the target question,
however, reveals that most students who answered the
question incorrectly argued that the friction force is

Question 1.

Solution

One end of a thin (massless) rod is glued to a
heavy block that is at rest on a table. The weight
of the block is 50 N. The table is exerting a 30 N
force on the block. Is the force the rod exerts on
the block upward, downward, or zero? Explain
your reasoning.

N=30 N

Massless
rod

Frod=20 N

Block

Fnet=0
Table

Question 2.

W=50 N

Solution
Magnet

N=6 N

A magnet weighing 10 N is placed on the side of
a refrigerator. A hand pushes upward with 6 N of
force but the magnet does not move. Is the friction
force exerted on the magnet upward, downward,
or zero? Explain your reasoning.

f=4 N

Fnet=0
Hand

W=10 N

FIG. 1. A pair of questions on forces and Newton’s laws. The free-body diagram for question 2 illustrates vertical forces only;
horizontal forces acting on the magnet in question 2 are not relevant to the case of static friction and therefore are not included.
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downward because it must “oppose” the upward force
exerted by the hand. This type of response typically does
not make explicit reference to Newton’s 2nd law, the
gravitational force, or the (irrelevant) magnetic force.
This empirical finding is consistent with dual-process
theories of reasoning (discussed in detail below), which
suggest that the “friction-opposes-hand” argument readily
comes to mind due to its ubiquity in many contexts
considered in introductory mechanics courses, is intuitively
appealing, and may be interfering with students’ ability to
access and apply physics concepts used previously on the
block question [27]. If the presence of the magnetic force is
a concern for some students, this concern is not evident
from their written responses. It appears that, instead, the
students embrace the “friction-opposes-hand” response as
highly plausible and do not find the need to analyze the
situation any further by applying Newton’s 2nd law. An
in-depth interpretation of this pattern of reasoning inconsistencies through the lens of DPTOR is included in
Sec. III B 2.
A variety of similar reasoning inconsistencies have been
reported by us and other investigators [17,18,28]. These
results span a variety of conceptual domains in physics and
occur both before and after research-based instruction. This
body of work suggests that such reasoning inconsistencies
are not due solely to a lack of knowledge and are not
exclusively associated with a particular type of instruction,
but instead are likely related to more fundamental aspects of
human reasoning. We take the view that at least some of the
mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are domain general. We have therefore begun to draw on certain theoretical
frameworks from cognitive science, such as dual-process
theories of reasoning, that provide a mechanistic account of
reasoning and decision making. We have found that DPTOR
can provide insight into observed inconsistencies in student
reasoning in physics [18], and have the potential to guide the
development of approaches to instruction that might increase
coherence in student reasoning [29,30].

Kahneman’s parsimonious, pragmatic definition of intuition
as “nothing more and nothing less than recognition.” [23,32]
Working from this view, we regard intuition simply as the
first-available mental model that is constructed in the mind
of a learner when they are confronted by a novel challenge.
As we discuss below, forming an initial mental model
happens quickly, and generally below the level of conscious
awareness. The formation of such a model occurs in
response to contextual cues and is based on the learner’s
repertoire of prior experiences. An expert and a novice
physics learner, when presented with the same set of cues in
a problem such as the magnet question, may well form
different initial mental models due to the vast differences in
their relevant prior experience.
We note that “intuitive knowledge” has often been used by
physics instructors and physics education researchers to refer
to ideas that originate from outside the physics curriculum.
In this way, intuitive knowledge has often been framed as
being in opposition to formal knowledge (i.e., to the ideas
presented in the physics classroom) [33–35]. This view of
intuitive knowledge conflicts with the view of intuition as
the first-available mental model, in that experts, through
repeated practice over many exposures, generally default to
the relevant formal physics knowledge as their first-available
response. For an expert, then, “intuitive knowledge” and
“formal knowledge” are one and the same, whereas for a
novice, they often are not. In our research with question
pairs, we have documented cases in which the “intuitive
response” given by students (i.e., novices) appears to
originate from formal knowledge covered in physics class
[28,33]. We thus argue that intuition is not limited to
everyday knowledge and experiences, but can also stem
from formal knowledge. A physics expert, with her extensive
repertoire of prior experiences (including formal knowledge), is likely to recognize relevant diagnostic cues in a
novel physics problem, and to then form a productive mental
model that is well aligned with a normative response. In
contrast, a novice, with more limited experience, may key on
spurious cues, and form a less productive mental model.

B. Intuition and reasoning
Before describing DPTOR in detail, we clarify our use
of the terms “intuition” and “intuitive response.” Physics
instructors often express the desire to help students develop
physical intuition. Unfortunately, however, intuition as a
construct is somewhat fuzzy. To the best of our knowledge,
operational definitions of intuition or intuitive reasoning
have not been articulated in the PER literature. As Singh
states, “Physical intuition is elusive—it is difficult to define,
cherished by those who possess it, and difficult to convey to
others. Physical intuition is at the same time an essential
component of expertise in physics” [31]. We concur with
Singh, but also recognize that experts and novices can differ
greatly in the accuracy of outcomes when making decisions
based on intuition. We have thus sought a view of intuition
capable of spanning the expert-novice continuum. We adopt

C. Dual-process theories of reasoning
and decision making
Since at least the 1960s, cognitive scientists have worked
toward domain-general models for human reasoning and
decision making. This work has led to the development of a
family of frameworks, dual-process theories of reasoning,
that successfully accounts for results from a variety of
cognitive performance tasks. Here we describe dual-process
theories, and discuss how researchers in physics education
have used them to account for student reasoning in physics.
Theories in the dual-process family model reasoning
with the same basic cognitive architecture, which involves
two distinct processes for thinking: one is fast and
automatic (process 1), the other is slow and effortful
(process 2) [23,24]. Process 1 is always active and operates
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beneath the level of conscious awareness. When confronted
with a novel situation, process 1 quickly creates a mental
model to account for “what is going on.” The model is
formed on the basis of prior experiences, which are
activated in associative memory in response to the features
of the situation (i.e., the contextual cues) identified as
relevant. Process 1 is the dominant cognitive mode,
allowing us to safely cross the road, orient to an exit sign
when leaving a building, or answer the question “What is
3 þ 2?” It is important to note that process 1 cannot be
turned off, and thus the first-available mental model is the
entry point in any reasoning chain.
Process 2, on the other hand, is logical and rule based. It
occupies our conscious awareness, is capable of computationally expensive serial processing and “cognitive simulation,” and is accompanied by a sense of cognitive effort.
Process 2 is thus generally experienced as aversive and is
engaged only sparingly. Process 2 allows us to solve a
jigsaw puzzle, parse a dense text, or answer the question
“What is 213 × 147?”
Most dual-process theories share these same key features
[23]. We draw on the heuristic-analytic theory of Evans
[24], which refers to processes 1 and 2 as the heuristic and
analytic processes, respectively. Figure 2, adapted from
Evans [24], illustrates basic cognitive operation in the
heuristic-analytic theory. To understand the interplay
between these two processes, we apply the heuristicanalytic theory to a hypothetical case of a student encountering a novel physics question. As the student reads the
question, the heuristic process generates an initial mental
model. According to Evans’ theory, only one mental model
is considered at a time (singularity principle), and that
model is selected based on its perceived relevance to the
current task (relevance principle). The student’s heuristic
process may focus on contextual cues irrelevant to
(or at least not diagnostic of) the normative physics
response. These cues, referred to as salient distracting
features [17,34,35], may then strongly influence the mental
model that is generated. On the magnet question, for
Heuristic process

Analytic process

Construct most plausible
or relevant model

Analytic system
intervention

No

Yes

Does model
satisfy?

No
Yes
Inference/judgment

FIG. 2. A diagram illustrating interactions between the heuristic
and analytical processes [24].
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example, the student might cue on “a push applied by a
hand,” which may activate prior life experiences involving
efforts to push a stationary object across a carpeted floor.
This in turn may lead to an initial mental model along the
lines of “friction resists an applied push.”
Once the heuristic process has generated a mental model,
the analytic process may or may not intervene. Thompson
argues that the default model is accompanied by a value
judgment about its plausibility, known as the feeling of
rightness [36]. If the feeling of rightness is strong and the
student is thus confident in his or her approach, an
intervention of the analytic process is unlikely; therefore,
the analytic process will be bypassed entirely and the
student will simply give a response aligned with his or her
default mental model [37,38]. In the magnet question
example, the student may be familiar with Newton’s
2nd law, and the gravitational force, but may not have
learned these ideas to a sufficient depth for a “red flag” to
be raised (i.e., conflict detection) in association with the
answer “friction is downward,” generated by the initial
model “friction resists an applied push.” This direct path
from first-available model to response, represented by the
pathway on the left side of Fig. 2, is often described as
cognitive miserliness, because computationally expensive
processing is absent [39,40]. Indeed, the reliance on one’s
“gut feeling” is overwhelmingly prevalent in everyday
activities, where it is highly efficient and fairly accurate
in guiding judgments.
Many questions posed in physics courses ask students to
explain their reasoning. This typically necessitates at least a
minimal level of intervention of the analytic process in
order to articulate some kind of explanation. Indeed, the job
of the analytic process is to ascertain whether or not the
default mental model is satisfactory for the task at hand
(satisficing principle) [24]. However, even if the analytic
process is engaged, it may not necessarily result in a careful
examination of the default mental model. In other words, a
student might not detect a conflict between this model and
formal knowledge, which would potentially lead to an
override of the default model in favor of a normative
response. Researchers have identified a few mechanisms
that impair these processes of conflict detection and
subsequent override. First, if a student has a strong feeling
of rightness for a particular model, the engagement of the
analytic process is likely to be superficial; thus, no conflict
detection would be likely. Second, the analytic process is
subject to reasoning biases of its own. Reasoners tend to be
poor at searching for alternative mental models or generating counterarguments, and thus the analytic process
may be driven by confirmation bias [41], thereby shifting
its role from conflict detection between the default model
and formal knowledge to rationalization of the default
model. Third, even if a reasoner attempts to examine
whether or not the default model is satisfactory, criteria
that a correct response must satisfy may not always be
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apparent, especially to a novice learner (even if these
criteria are obvious to an expert). As such, an incorrect
first-available mental model may still be the final response
even after the engagement of the analytic process. This
pathway is represented in the lower-right portion of Fig. 2.
If, however, the analytic process is engaged, and a conflict
with the first-available mental model is detected, the
analytic process will hand the task off to the heuristic
process for another mental model, as shown in the top-right
portion of Fig. 2. Once this new model is generated, the
reasoning cycle repeats, which could lead to a sustained
override of the first-available mental model in the presence
of the adequate relevant mindware.
As illustrated above, the nature of that very first available
mental model (which is heavily informed by the student’s
background knowledge and intuition as well as contextual
cues) plays a critical role in the student’s overall reasoning
process, possibly even precluding the use of relevant
knowledge and skills that the student may possess. In
order to better characterize the nature of human reasoning
and how it may be impacting students as they answer
physics questions, we draw upon some other closely related
constructs from cognitive science in the section below.
D. Ingredients for productive thinking:
Mindware and cognitive reflection
1. Mindware
It is indisputable that relevant knowledge, in the form of
rules and procedures, is critical for successful reasoning.
In the cognitive science literature, the term mindware, in an
analogy to computer software, is used to refer to a
collection of “rules, knowledge, procedures, and strategies
that a person can retrieve from memory in order to aid
decision making and problem solving.” [25] Mindware
contributes to the formation of the first-available mental
model, conflict detection, and the generation of productive
alternative mental models (i.e., sustained override). Rather
than being simply present or absent, mindware may be
instantiated to a greater or lesser depth. Deeper instantiation
can support (i) immediate cueing of a first-available
mental model consistent with the normative response or
(ii) increased conflict detection as well as increased
capacity for generating an improved model.
A physics expert will have many modules of physicsrelated mindware, such as Newton’s 2nd law, ingrained
much more deeply than a student just learning Newton’s
laws. A physics expert may know Newton’s laws so
deeply that the cueing and activation of the heuristic
process occurs in accordance with this normative physics
knowledge. That is, for the expert, the intuitive, firstavailable response to the magnet question is likely to be
the normative response. However, for students with less
robust mindware, if the first-available response is flawed,
then conflict detection and override are also likely to be
unproductive because threats to the validity of this first

available intuitive mental model are less likely to be
recognized.
For the magnet question presented in this study, we
identified the following pieces of knowledge as constituting
the mindware necessary for a successful solution:
(i) Fnet ¼ ma, where Fnet is the vector sum of all forces,
and (ii) for an object at rest (in which case a ¼ 0), Fnet must
be zero and thus the vertical component of Fnet must also be
zero. It is, however, challenging to design an instrument
(or a task) that determines the degree to which a student
possesses this mindware. Several approaches could be
considered. For example, a student could be asked to
articulate Newton’s 2nd law and the conditions necessary
for an object to remain at rest. This approach, however, has
multiple limitations. First, a student could possess declarative knowledge of Newton’s 2nd law and may even
memorize the condition for an object to remain at rest.
Yet, the student may not be able to recognize the applicability of this knowledge even to a basic scenario that
involves more than two forces; in addition, he or she may
not be able to identify forces acting on the object or to
execute vector addition. For these reasons, we argued that
perhaps asking students to consider a basic scenario that
requires the application of the identified knowledge is a
more informative measure of student mindware. Those
students who correctly analyze the scenario are regarded as
having at least the minimum level of the necessary mindware. The block question discussed above seems to fit these
criteria; it presents a basic situation that involves more than
two forces and requires the application of the same set of
steps as the magnet question in order to arrive at an answer.
Data suggest that only 1 student out of 33 students (∼3%)
who answered the block question incorrectly provided a
correct response with correct reasoning to the magnet
question, while ∼70% of the students who answered the
block question correctly gave incorrect responses to the
magnet question (41 out of 58 students). These results
suggest that it is highly unlikely that students will arrive at a
correct answer to the magnet question if they failed to do so
on the block question. As such, it is reasonable to treat the
block question as an adequate instrument for measuring
whether or not a student possesses at least the minimum
level of the mindware necessary to answer the magnet
question correctly; namely, the student recognizes the
applicability of Newton’s 2nd law to a basic situation
involving an object at rest and can successfully apply the
two pieces of knowledge articulated above.
2. Cognitive reflection
In addition to mindware, another factor vital for productive reasoning is a general tendency to critically
evaluate mental models [26,42]. Differences in relevant
mindware notwithstanding, some reasoners are more likely
to scrutinize initial models put forward by the heuristic
process, and less likely to act solely as cognitive misers.
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1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost?
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long
would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half
the lake?

FIG. 3. Three-item cognitive reflection test. (The correct
answers are 5 cents, 5 minutes, and 47 days, respectively.)

The ability to mediate the heuristic process by reasoning
more analytically is typically referred to as cognitive
reflection. The reasoner with a stronger disposition toward
cognitive reflection will be more likely to engage in conflict
detection and subsequent override, which in turn increases
the likelihood of reaching a correct answer.
The cognitive reflection test (CRT), developed by
Frederick and validated and widely employed in psychology research, has been used to gauge this disposition
toward cognitive reflection. [26] Toplak, West, and
Stanovich argue that the CRT is “a particularly potent
measure of the tendency toward miserly processing,” with a
lower score indicating increased cognitive miserliness [40].
In the literature, there is a consensus that the CRT is a
measure of a reasoner’s disposition toward “actively openminded thinking,” (i.e., the tendency to actively search for
alternative answers) [26,41,43–45].
The original CRT, shown in Fig. 3, consists of three
questions; a revised version contains seven questions [46].
Each question has an intuitively appealing (but incorrect)
answer that, for most reasoners, comes to mind immediately and often without conscious effort. To answer
correctly, this intuitively appealing response must be tested
by the analytic process, deemed unsatisfactory (i.e., a
conflict must be detected), and then replaced with a correct
answer (i.e., an override process must be successfully
competed). For the questions on the CRT, this intervention
pathway, if it occurs, typically does so upon only brief
reflection, rather than requiring extended analytical
processing. This is likely because the CRT items require
mindware, such as basic arithmetic, that is relatively strong
for most adults (particularly for students enrolled in
calculus-based introductory physics). A single point on
the CRT is awarded for each correct answer, and a score of
2 or 3 is regarded as indicating a strong tendency to mediate
intuition with analytical thinking.
3. Interaction between mindware
and cognitive reflection
One aspect of the interaction between mindware and
the tendency toward cognitive reflection is particularly
relevant to our work. Based on the DPTOR framework,
there are three possible sources of processing error that
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lead to an incorrect inference: (i) missing or inadequate
mindware, (ii) failure to initiate a conflict detection (i.e.,
failure to engage in cognitive reflection) between a default
(miserly) response and the learned normative mindware,
and (iii) failure to sustain an override of the default model
with a new model consistent with the normative mindware. The “upstream” process of conflict detection must
occur in order for the “downstream” process of a sustained
override to take place. The sustained override could be
particularly challenging even for reasoners with strong
cognitive reflection skills. As stated above, even if a
reasoner engages in cognitive reflection and questions the
validity of the default model, in many real situations the
criteria that need to be satisfied in order to accept or reject
the default model are not readily available. For example, a
student who has learned Newton’s 2nd law at the level
adequate to apply it correctly in the basic situation of the
block at rest on a table, may not recognize that the same
mindware could be used to check the validity of the
default response to the magnet question. Instead, process
2 may take a different approach: this student may
recognize that the default response that “friction opposes
the force of the hand” has worked successfully in solving
other physics problems. The student may perceive that a
criterion related to how often this approach has been
successful is appropriate for establishing the validity of
the argument, rather than checking for consistency with
the relevant mindware. In a recent paper by Stanovich, he
points out that a minimal level of mindware as well as
cognitive reflection skills are necessary to initiate the
process of conflict detection, but more deeply instantiated
mindware is required for a sustained override. Indeed, he
notes that “conflict is sometimes detected even in cases
where a subject did not successfully override the intuitive
response.” [47,48]. From our own work, the quote below
from a physics student illustrates her reflection on this
processing error: “I tried to formally think it through by
trying to remember the magnitude equations and by
thinking of the different forces or anything that may be
relevant to the problem. I was uncertain with my formal
thinking attempt, so I went with my intuitive reasoning.”
E. Summary of diagnostic outcomes
from theoretical framework
Dual-process theories suggest that stronger mindware—
such as, for example, a conceptual understanding of
Newton’s laws—impacts physics performance in a variety
of ways, but that cognitive reflection is likely to be most
relevant in those cases in which a student’s first-available
mental model is incorrect. Questions developed through
physics education research, such as the magnet question,
often elicit a strong intuitive response, and thus frequently
require successful detection and override to answer
correctly. We are particularly concerned about poor student
performance on such questions even from students who
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successfully applied the relevant mindware in other situations. We argue that by applying the screening-target
methodology coupled with the CRT as a measure of the
tendency toward cognitive reflection, it is possible to
identify a set of diagnostic outcomes that suggest specific
approaches for further curriculum development. In particular, if student performance on the screening question is
adequate, thus suggesting the presence of (at least) a
minimal level of mindware necessary to reach a correct
response, then two outcomes are worth considering.

III. PHASE 1: DISENTANGLING THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF MINDWARE AND
COGNITIVE REFLECTION SKILLS TO
PRODUCTIVE PHYSICS REASONING PRIOR
TO THE INTERVENTION

1. Outcome 1
Student performance on the target question is worse
than that on the screening question and no relationship
between performance on the target question and CRT score
is detected. This outcome may occur after basic instruction
on relevant topics but before targeted instruction focusing
on the inconsistency between students’ reasoning on the
screening question and their responses to the target question. This outcome suggests that even those students who
possess the ability to recognize and mediate instances of
intuitive thought (i.e., those who tend toward cognitive
reflection as opposed to miserly processing) do not yet
possess mindware strong enough either to check for
consistency between the normative mindware and the
default response or to resolve such inconsistencies.
Instruction that focuses on strengthening mindware and
building coherence in student knowledge may be necessary
in order to initiate and sustain a productive override. In our
study, this outcome was observed on a pretest, as discussed
in Sec. II B 2. Specific instructional strategies were proposed in Sec. IV and evaluated in Sec. V B.
2. Outcome 2
Student performance on the target question is worse than
that on the screening question and a positive relationship is
detected between performance on the magnet question and
CRT score. This outcome suggests that perhaps students
did develop mindware coherent enough to recognize and
resolve inconsistencies between normative mindware and
the default response, but only students with high CRT
scores benefitted by engaging in cognitive reflection and
utilizing such mindware productively. In our study, this
outcome occurred after our instructional intervention, as
discussed in Sec. V B. Our DPTOR-based framework
suggests two possible approaches for improving performance even further: (i) focus on improving student cognitive reflection skills, or (ii) improve student mindware to
the level of automaticity such that a default response is
consistent with the normative mindware independent of
cognitive reflection skills. See Sec. IVA for further
discussion of the advantages and limitations of these kinds
of approaches.

A. Methodology
For simplicity and clarity of the discussion, the main
body of this paper describes our investigation conducted in
the context of a single student population. The reproducibility of our results from two additional student populations is discussed in Sec. VI.
Data were collected in the introductory calculus-based
mechanics course at a research-focused university in the
U.S. Students taking the course were primarily intending to
pursue majors in the physical sciences or in engineering.
The intervention was administered and data were collected
as part of the laboratory component of the course.
This project utilized four data streams. Three of these
streams involved physics content questions related to the
block-magnet sequence shown in Fig. 1, including (i) data
collected before any intervention had taken place but after
all relevant lecture instruction (“pretest” data); (ii) data that
were collected as part of the instructional intervention
(“intervention” data), which included three distinct stages
described in detail in Sec. IV; and (iii) data that were
collected as part of a course exam (“post-test” data). For all
data from streams 1–3, responses were coded as either
“correct” or “incorrect.” A response was coded as correct if
it contained the correct answer supported by correct
reasoning. The fourth stream was the 3-item CRT described
in Sec. II. The CRT was administered early in the term and
was included at the end of a regular ungraded “pretest”
assignment in advance of a weekly lab. Students received
participation credit for completing the CRT, regardless of
the correctness of their responses.
We used binary logistic regression to probe the relationships among variables of interest. In a logistic regression
analysis, a model is constructed that predicts the probability
of a particular dichotomous outcome (here, whether a
student will respond correctly or incorrectly to a question)
based on the value of various predictor variables (such as a
student’s score on the CRT or performance on a particular
pretest question). A more detailed discussion of logistic
regression is included in Appendix.
B. Preintervention assessment:
Data, analysis, and results
The pretest was administered online outside of class as
part of a regular ungraded assignment in advance of a
weekly lab. Students were asked to complete the assignment individually, and credit was given based on effort
rather than correctness of responses. Students were shown
the block-magnet question pair on a single page of the
online assignment. They were asked to answer each
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question in a multiple-choice format and were provided
with a text box in which to explain their reasoning.
1. Discussion of inconsistencies
in student performance
As shown in Table I, before the intervention, approximately two-thirds of the students answered the block
question correctly. The overwhelming majority of students
who answered the question incorrectly apparently did not
attempt to apply Newton’s 2nd law. The most prevalent
incorrect response seems to have been cued by the notion
that a massless rod cannot exert a force since, as one student
noted, “the mass of the rod is zero, F ¼ ma, so the force by
the rod must also be zero.” A smaller fraction of students
used the included figure to argue that “the hand appears to
push on the rod, so the rod pushes down on the block.”
There is no evidence that these students attempted to
answer the block question by applying appropriate formal
physics knowledge.
Student performance on the magnet question was much
weaker than that on the block question. Only ∼20% of the
students answered the magnet question correctly. A significant fraction of those students who correctly applied
Newton’s 2nd law on the block question failed to do so on
the magnet question. Less than 30% of the students who
answered the block question correctly also applied
Newton’s 2nd law consistently on the magnet question.
As discussed in Sec. II A, the overwhelming majority of the
students who answered the magnet question incorrectly
argued that “the force of friction must point down because
friction opposes the applied force by the hand.”
2. Interpretation of inconsistencies through DPTOR
We find that on two questions that both require the
application of Newton’s 2nd law, student performance
differed dramatically. Students did not apply the necessary
mindware in a consistent manner. Our theoretical framework posits that people reason incorrectly because (a) they
do not possess adequate mindware, or (b) they do not
engage in productive cognitive reflection. To determine
which instructional strategies would best help students
recognize and address inconsistencies in their reasoning, it
was necessary to at least attempt to disentangle mindware
from cognitive reflection skills and to investigate the
TABLE I. Average CRT scores and performance results from
the block and magnet questions administered before the intervention (N ¼ 91).
hCRTi

1.99

Performance on the block question (pre-intervention)
64%
Performance on the magnet question (pre-intervention)
20%
Performance on the magnet question of only those
N ¼ 58
students who answered the block question correctly
29%
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relationships among these two factors and student performance on the magnet question.
Identifying relationships among mindware, cognitive
reflection skills, and student performance on the preintervention magnet question.—Logistic regression models
were generated in order to test the relationships among
student performance on the magnet question, the presence
of at least a minimum level of mindware (as measured by
performance on the block question), and the tendency
toward cognitive reflection (as measured by the CRT). As
discussed earlier, a correct answer on the block question
appears to be necessary, but not sufficient, for a correct
answer on the magnet question, which is confirmed by the
results of the logistic regression models shown in Table II.
(Model statistics: χ 2 ¼ 11.4, p ¼ 0.001). The CRT score,
however, does not appear to be a predictor of success on the
magnet question.
Through the lens of DPTOR, the results suggest that the
majority of students who acquired the mindware necessary
to answer both questions correctly seemed to abandon the
correct line of reasoning on the magnet question in favor
of a more readily available mental model consistent with
the notion that “the force of friction opposes the applied
force.” This mental model may be more readily available
(and therefore intuitively appealing) to the students because
it is often used correctly and appropriately in a variety of
situations discussed in introductory mechanics courses. For
example, if a block remains at rest on a horizontal surface
even though it is pushed by a single horizontal force, then it
is inferred that a frictional force also acts on the block in a
direction opposite to the applied force. In fact, the concepts
of static and kinetic forces of friction are commonly
introduced in the context of a block, on a horizontal
surface, being pushed or pulled by a single horizontal
applied force [49–51]. In addition, the notion that “friction
must be overcome for an object to move” is consistent with
everyday experience and therefore makes intuitive sense as
well. It is thus not surprising that this readily available
mental model that “friction opposes the applied force by the
hand” immediately comes to mind and is perceived as
relevant and correct.
The results of the logistic regression model suggest no
association between student performance on the magnet
question and the level of cognitive reflection skills. This
result is consistent with outcome 1 predicted by our

TABLE II. The results of logistic regression models that link
student preintervention performance on the magnet question and
the presence of mindware (as measured by the performance on
the block question).
Dependent variable

Predictors

Coeff

p

Performance on the block Intercept −3.47 0.001
question preintervention Mindware
2.59 0.014
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theoretical framework. Indeed, even those students who do
not tend to immediately jump to conclusions and accept a
first-available mental model as correct must identify a
compelling reason to go against their intuitive responses.
After having applied certain ideas repeatedly in many
different situations, novice learners may perceive these ideas
as generalizable or “an absolute truth.” For example, for
most students outside of elementary school, the answer to the
question “What is 3 þ 3?” comes with “cognitive ease” [23]:
they have practiced this addition successfully in many other
situations and therefore may not perceive the need to check
for the correctness of their answer by engaging in unnecessary counting on fingers. Similarly, it is possible that, for
some students in our study, the learned heuristic “friction
opposes the applied force” reached a certain level of
automaticity for the reasons described above: they have
applied this model of friction successfully in many other
situations and therefore may not have perceived the need to
question the applicability of that model in the context of the
magnet problem. Moreover, even if a student raised doubts
about the applicability of the “friction opposes the applied
force” model to the given situation, the normative mindware
associated with Newton’s 2nd law may not have been strong
enough for the student to recognize that Newton’s 2nd law
must be used as a criterion for checking the validity of that
mental model. As such, it appears that even students with a
high tendency toward cognitive reflection did not successfully engage in the processes of conflict detection and
override due either to a strong feeling of rightness that
accompanied the heuristic response or to a weakness in
normative mindware (or possibly both).
The lack of dependence on the CRT score furthermore
suggests that those students who answered the magnet
question correctly did so because their first available mental
models were likely to have been based on a correct and
formal application of Newton’s 2nd law. We suspect that
the normative mindware of these students was strong
enough that they immediately and subconsciously recognized the magnet question as one that is solved by applying
Newton’s 2nd law; in other words, the mindware of these
students had approached the level of automaticity.
The pretest results, interpreted through the lens of
DPTOR, suggest that student performance could be
improved by reducing the feeling of rightness of the
“friction opposes the applied force” response and by
helping students recognize that Newton’s 2nd law could
not only be used as a tool for solving physics questions
(e.g., by “balancing forces” on the block question), but also
as a criterion that must be satisfied in considering the
applicability of a specific heuristic (e.g., if the vector sum of
all the forces in the magnet question does not yield zero, the
solution is incorrect). We speculated that those students
who answered the screening question correctly, but failed
to do so on the target question, possessed the first aspect
of the necessary mindware, but needed to acquire (or

strengthen) the second aspect as well, which is required for
a successful conflict detection and override.
IV. PHASE 2: DESIGN OF INTERVENTION:
RATIONALE, STRUCTURE, AND
METHODOLOGY
On the surface, the instructional goal of our intervention
was to improve student performance on questions similar to
the magnet question—namely, questions on which many
students may not be able to apply the relevant mindware that
they may already possess. Our underlying focus was to use
DPTOR and the associated cognitive constructs of mindware
and cognitive reflection as a framework for doing so. In this
section, we review our overall approach and then describe
the stages of the intervention, the rationale behind each
stage, details of implementation and data collection.
A. Overall rationale
As demonstrated by students’ pretest performance, many
students appeared to possess the first aspect of the relevant
mindware necessary to solve the magnet question correctly,
namely they demonstrated the ability to apply Newton’s
2nd law to an object at rest in the absence of salient
distracting features. However, many of these students failed
to apply this mindware on the magnet question due to the
presence of an alternative, highly accessible mental model
that seems to overshadow the relevance of Newton’s
2nd law. The lack of a relationship between student
performance on the magnet question and CRT score
suggests that many students did not perceive Newton’s
second law as a criterion that must be satisfied in order to
check for the validity of their first-available intuitive
responses, thus lacking mindware necessary for conflict
detection and override. This suggested a need to design
instruction to help students improve both aspects of mindware with a specific focus on strengthening the second
aspect: helping students recognize how to apply Newton’s
2nd law as a criterion that needs to be satisfied while
checking the validity of a particular response (e.g., deciding
whether the learned heuristic that friction opposes the
applied force holds in a given situation). For this instructional approach, we would anticipate that post-assessment
performance would be related to both a student’s mindware
(i.e., did a student acquire the two aspects of mindware
described above?) and a student’s cognitive reflection skills
(i.e., did a student recognize the need to check the validity
of their first-available response by applying an appropriate
criterion?).
Alternatively, in order to improve student performance,
we could focus exclusively on improving the first aspect of
the normative mindware associated with Newton’s 2nd law
described above to the point of automatic and immediate
recognition of the relevance of that mindware to the magnet
task [48]. This could be achieved, for example, by training
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students to apply Newton’s 2nd law in a variety of
situations in which an object remains at rest. After such
training, Newton’s 2nd law would likely become a highly
accessible mental model, which most students would
automatically apply to a situation analogous to the magnet
question. In this case, the high accessibility of this mental
model would overshadow all other alternative mental
models and would render the engagement of cognitive
reflection skills unnecessary for most students. (Indeed, as
was the case on the preintervention magnet task, cognitive
reflection skills would not be expected to strongly impact
student performance since essentially all students giving a
correct answer on the postassessment would have
extremely robust mindware ensuring that Newton’s
2nd law would be a highly accessible model independent
of the cognitive reflection tendencies.) However, while this
approach would probably improve student performance, it
may not help students build coherence and learn how to
check and resolve inconsistencies between the learned
heuristics and the normative mindware.
A third option, instruction focusing exclusively on the
engagement of cognitive reflection skills without paying
attention to mindware, is not likely to be fruitful since,
according to Stanovich, in the absence of relevant mindware, both the detection of red flags and productive
exploration of alternatives are extremely unlikely [25,48].
Indeed, this appeared to be the case on the pretest (see
Sec. III B 2). In another project by our research team, we
found that an intervention designed to support productive
analytic engagement had little to no impact on students who
lacked the requisite mindware [30].
An argument could be made that each of the first two
approaches outlined above could be appropriate under
certain conditions. For example, the second approach
may be favored in cases in which an automatic application
of certain types of essential mindware (e.g., algebraic or
vector operations, unit conversion, or application of the
right-hand rule) is critical for successful reasoning and
problem solving on more challenging tasks [52]. However,
in our context, we argue that it is more pragmatic to focus
on designing instructional interventions that foster the
development of mindware necessary to support productive
cognitive reflection because cognitive reflection is a critical
element of reasoning and thus one of our instructional goals
for its own sake. As such, we tried to design an intervention
that helps students develop or strengthen both aspects of the
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normative mindware discussed above and supports the
engagement of their cognitive reflection skills. The latter
could be achieved by providing opportunities to recognize
the applicability of Newton’s 2nd law as a criterion that
needs to be satisfied in checking for consistency between
the first available response and the normative mindware.
This approach would help students learn to recognize red
flags in their reasoning (i.e., engage in conflict detection)
and to resolve possible inconsistencies (i.e., execute a
sustained override).
We structured the intervention in three stages. In stage 1,
students work individually on a task designed to raise
awareness of similarities between the block and magnet
questions; during this stage, students are given opportunities to recognize that the condition necessary for keeping
⃗ net ¼ 0) must be satisfied independent of
an object at rest (F
the types of forces involved. In stage 2, students work in
groups to analyze the original block and magnet question
pair. In stage 3, students work in groups through a more
scaffolded activity, answering questions designed to guide
them to apply Newton’s 2nd law and to refine their ideas
surrounding the alternative model “friction opposes the
hand.” The timing of the pretest, intervention, and post-test
relative to instruction on forces is shown in Fig. 4. Below,
we describe the rationale for and implementation of each
stage in detail.
B. Intervention stages: Overview and rationale
1. Stage 1: Individual work intervention designed
to raise awareness of similarities between block
and magnet questions
Stage 1 was given immediately after students completed
the block-magnet question pair on the pretest as part of an
online assignment administered outside of class in
advance of a weekly lab or recitation. Students were
taken to a new page in which they were provided with a
(correct) solution to the block question, shown in Fig. 5,
and were asked to indicate whether or not they agree with
the given solution and to explain their reasoning. The text
of the solution was written using generalized terms such
that it did not explicitly reference the physical context
(e.g., the block, the specific forces acting on the block) in
order to foreground the correct approach to analyzing
forces acting on an object at rest. (To be consistent with a
force labeling convention practiced in class, the

Instruction on Forces
Pretest

Intervention

Block
Magnet
question question

Stage 1

Individual assignment

FIG. 4.

Stage 2

Group work

Instructional sequence.
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If an object remains at rest, its acceleration is zero; therefore,
the net force acting on that object is zero. In this case, we know
that two forces of given magnitudes act on the object: a
downward force of magnitude 50 N and an upward force of
magnitude 30 N, as shown at right. In order for the net force to
be zero, a third force of magnitude 20 N must be directed upward.

N=30 N
Frod=20 N

Fnet=0
W=50 N

FIG. 5.

Feature-free solution to the block question as part of stage 1.

accompanying free-body diagram did reference the specific forces acting on the block, as shown in Fig. 5.) Next,
the students were asked whether they still agreed with
their original answer to the magnet question, and to
explain why they agreed or disagreed. If a student
responded that he or she disagreed with his or her original
response, the student was given another opportunity to
respond to the magnet question, and this response was
recorded as that student’s stage 1 response.
While it is important to note that this feature-free
solution to the block question does not directly connect
the block and magnet questions and does not explicitly state
that a similar analysis should be used in both cases, it was
intended to act as a gentle nudge for students, potentially
triggering a more productive engagement of the analytic
process by raising awareness of similarities between the
two scenarios. According to DPTOR, if students recognize
similarities between both scenarios while noting their
discrepant reasoning approaches, it is more likely that
potential red flags associated with their first-available
mental models for the magnet question will impact their
reasoning process (e.g., by lowering their feeling of rightness and fostering a deeper engagement of the analytic
process). This stage of the intervention, therefore, had
the potential to help students (i) recognize similarities
between the two scenarios (i.e., both objects are at rest),
(ii) recognize that conditions for an object to remain at rest
⃗ net ¼ 0) must be satisfied independent of the specific
(F
features of a given situation (e.g., types of forces and types
of objects), and (iii) identify and resolve inconsistencies
between the intuitive responses to the magnet question and
the normative mindware.
2. Stages 2 and 3: Group work
Students worked in small groups in stages 2 and 3 of the
intervention sequence. The group work format was
expressly chosen since it allows for socially mediated
metacognition [36,53], in which the group members help
shape and guide the thinking and reasoning of the group.
The group, which is the effective unit of analysis, necessarily engages in self-assessment and self-regulation and
draws upon its collective metacognitive knowledge while
working collaboratively. The metacognition of the group is

effectively externalized; with members generating new
ideas, assessing information and approaches, disclosing
their own thinking, requesting feedback on their own
thinking, and monitoring their partners’ thinking [53].
Through this collaborative thinking process, it is more
likely that red flags will be identified and that intuitive ideas
may be mediated via analytical reasoning—namely, collaborative thinking has the potential to support the cognitive reflection of the group. In addition, by externalizing
metacognition and the nature of reasoning, it is plausible
that group work may help students learn the value of and
strategies for cognitive reflection, which can in turn be
employed while working individually.
Stage 2: Group work intervention involving the block and
magnet pair.—This stage, which enabled students to revisit
the block-magnet question pair in groups, was administered
in the laboratory component of the course a short time after
students completed the web-based stage 1. Students worked
with their regular lab partners in groups of two. (A few
groups had three students.) Each group was tasked with
discussing their approaches to the questions until a group
consensus was reached, at which point a single group
consensus response (including both an answer and reasoning) was submitted via a web-based form for each of the two
questions. As discussed earlier, this intervention was
designed to foster cognitive reflection and promote consistency checking via socially mediated metacognition. In
addition, we anticipated that the opportunity to collaboratively revisit the block and magnet question pair could also
help strengthen student mindware, if necessary.
Stage 3: Group work intervention consisting of a
sequence of guiding questions.—This stage of the intervention was designed exclusively for those lab groups that did
not answer the magnet question correctly after stage 2. Using
the same web-based online system, these groups were
automatically served a final sequence of questions that
was intended to provide more scaffolding and step-by-step
guidance for analyzing the magnet question. In the sequence
of guiding questions, groups were shown the magnet
question once again, but were asked to consider two different
scenarios. In the first scenario, the hand is not exerting a
force on the stationary magnet. The second scenario is
identical to the original magnet question, in which the hand
is applying a force of 6 N upward on the magnet. Students
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were asked to draw a free-body diagram for the stationary
magnet in both cases; they were then asked to determine the
net force on the magnet in each case and to record their
reasoning. Students were also asked what their responses
suggest about the direction of the forces of friction acting on
the magnet in both scenarios and to explain their reasoning.
Students were expected to recognize that Newton’s 2nd law
must hold in both scenarios; however, in the absence of a
hand, the friction does oppose the applied force, which, in
this case, is the force of gravity (and not that applied by the
hand), while in the presence of the hand, the force of static
friction must oppose the vector sum of the forces by gravity
and the hand. Therefore, the activities of Stage 3 emphasized
that in some cases the heuristic response of “friction
opposing the applied force” is consistent with the normative
response while in others a more careful analysis via the
application of the Newton’s 2nd law is required. Hence,
stage 3 was designed to stress that Newton’s 2nd law must be
satisfied in validating a specific response.
C. Intervention data and analysis strategies
Student responses to the intervention questions were
coded as either “correct” or “incorrect.” A response was
coded as correct if it contained the correct answer supported
by the correct reasoning. For stages 2 and 3, a correct code
assigned to a student indicates that the student had been
part of a group that had responded correctly, suggesting that
the student agreed with the correct answer even if he or she
did not necessarily generate it on their own.
We also created a variable to measure whether a student had
ever responded correctly to the magnet question during any
intervention stage. This variable, called Any_point_magnet,
was coded as a 1 if any of the responses to the magnet
question, either on the pretest or during any stage of the
intervention, was correct. If a student had never provided
(or been part of a group that submitted) a correct response to
the magnet question, this variable was coded as a 0.
Student performance on the pre-intervention block
question does not serve as a suitable measure of mindware
in relation to the post-test performance because improved
student performance at every intervention stage suggests
improved mindware as a result of the intervention. In this
study, we argue that the variable Any_point_magnet could
serve as a reasonable estimate of the presence of mindware
after the intervention in the sense that a student’s successful
performance on the magnet question during the intervention could serve as an indication that the student either
successfully applied the normative mindware to arrive at
the correct answer or successfully applied the normative
mindware in order to detect and override an intuitively
appealing response. In either case, we argue that the student
possessed and successfully practiced applying the mindware necessary to answer the magnet question correctly or,
at the very least, the student participated in a discussion
with a lab partner and agreed with the correct solution that
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contradicted his or her individual response. We note that
there are several possible ways to use the data collected in
this study to estimate mindware (including, for example,
taking into account whether a correct response was given
during only the individual component of the intervention).
We found that the results were largely consistent and
independent of a specific approach. As such, we adopted
the most parsimonious model in which the variable
Any_point_magnet represents a reasonable estimate of
the presence of mindware. We also note that the variable
Any_point_magnet provides the most proximal (in content)
measure of mindware. Given that we are interested in
probing the extent to which student post-test performance is
linked to cognitive reflection skills (in addition to mindware), the detection of such a link even after the most
proximal measure of mindware is taken into account
strengthens any claims that we may make. Therefore, we
argue that the endorsement of a correct answer to the
magnet question at any point during the instructional
sequence is an adequate (most parsimonious and proximal)
measure of the presence of relevant mindware.
V. PHASE 3: USING ASSESSMENT DATA TO
EXAMINE IMPACT OF INTERVENTION ON
ASPECTS OF PRODUCTIVE REASONING
A. Postintervention data collection
On the intervention post-test, a four-part question in
the context of a stationary magnet on a refrigerator was
administered as part of a course exam (shown in Fig. 6).
Students were asked to identify the direction of the static
friction force on the magnet in each of the four cases. The
correct answers for Cases 1–4 are that the friction forces are
upward, zero, upward, and upward, respectively. The posttest was administered in a free-response format and
included on a standard midterm exam. Responses were
coded as correct if the student indicated the correct
direction for the friction force in all four of the cases
and supported these answers with correct reasoning.
B. Mid- and postintervention assessments:
Data analysis and results
As shown in Table III, every intervention stage
improved student performance by ∼10%–25%. No single
intervention stage was clearly more impactful than the rest.
After the set of three interventions, the majority of the
students (∼75%) gave a correct response to the magnet
question at least once at some point during instruction (or at
least agreed with the correct answer).
The data indicate that there was a dramatic increase in
student performance from pre- to post-test (from ∼20%
correct on the magnet question to ∼60% correct on the
post-test). However, these results are somewhat less
impressive once two factors are taken into account. First,
most students in the study had at least three opportunities to
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FIG. 6.

The post-test question.

consider the magnet question and to modify their thinking.
Second, roughly 30% of those students who gave (or at
least agreed with) a correct answer on the magnet question
at any point during the intervention reverted back to the
incorrect notion that friction opposes the applied force by
a singular and highly salient external agent. Our results
indicate that this identified pattern of student reasoning is
very robust, persistent, and does not seem to be easily
altered by the “quick fixes” that each interventional stage
was designed to afford.
Further data analysis was conducted in order to pinpoint
more precisely why, even after targeted instruction specifically designed to help students recognize and resolve
inconsistencies between their intuitive responses and
normative mindware, some students were successful on

TABLE III. Student performance on pretest, intervention
questions, and post-test.
Performance on the block question (pretest)

64%

Performance on the
magnet question

20%
32%
49%
73%
74%

Pretest
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Correct at any point during
the intervention process

Correct on the post-test

62%

Correct on the post-test of those who were correct
at some point during instruction

69%

the post-test while others were not. Results of a logistic
regression model, shown in Eq. (1), suggest that both
mindware and the tendency toward cognitive reflection
play a role in a student’s performance on the post test. The
logistic regression model predicts the probability of success
on the post-test as a function of two variables: (i) whether
a student had ever responded correctly to the magnet
question during any of the intervention stages (called
Any_point_magnet and taken as a measure of mindware
as discussed in Sec. IV C), and (ii) cognitive reflection
skills, as measured by CRT score. (All coefficients are
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level, model statistics are χ 2 ¼ 12.2, df ¼ 2, p < 0.01).
p¼

1
1þe

ð1.7−1.4×Any point magnet−0.6×CRTÞ

:

ð1Þ

The results suggest that those students who gave a
correct response to the magnet question at least once
during the intervention and who also possessed high
cognitive reflection skills were much more likely to answer
the post-test question correctly compared to those who
answered the magnet question correctly during the intervention but scored zero on the CRT. For example, the odds
of success on the post-test question increases by a factor
of approximately 6 (given by e0.6×3 ) for a student who
answered correctly during instruction and received a score
of 3 on the CRT compared to a student who also answered
the magnet question correctly during instruction but scored
zero on the CRT.
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The results suggest that the success of our intervention
was mediated by the students’ cognitive reflection skills.
Indeed, students with a stronger tendency toward cognitive
reflection seemed to access the necessary mindware successfully under exam conditions. These students either
immediately recognized the applicability of Newton’s
2nd Law to the post-test or were able to engage in
successful cognitive reflection. The latter would first
involve the initiation of an “upstream” process of conflict
detection (e.g., asking whether the heuristic that friction
opposes the applied force by the string is applicable here)
followed by the “downstream” process of a sustained
override that utilizes Newton’s 2nd Law as a criterion
for checking the validity of the heuristic response.
However, even in the presence of the mindware, our
analysis indicates that students with weaker cognitive
reflection skills tended to jump to conclusions and accept
the intuitively appealing response that friction opposes the
applied force by a highly salient agent (e.g., a hand or a
string,) as correct. Through the lens of DPTOR, this result
suggests that these students most likely failed to initiate
the “upstream” process of conflict detection and therefore
never had the opportunity to utilize their mindware for
sustaining a productive override. For such students, the
impact of the intervention appeared to be short lived. These
results are consistent with outcome 2 discussed in Sec. II E.
VI. REPLICABILITY OF RESULTS
We were particularly interested in exploring the extent
to which the results from our intervention and analysis
could be replicated at different institutions. If results were
similar across multiple institutions, it would be more likely
that the proposed mechanisms were, in fact, at play and
that our findings could be more easily generalized. We
therefore administered the intervention in the introductory
calculus-based mechanics course at two additional universities (B and C in Fig. 7) in the U.S., which serve a
diverse range of students as measured by incoming Math
SAT scores. (Note that University A corresponds to the
primary implementation site.)
The intervention implementations at these other sites
necessarily varied somewhat due to instructional constraints. At University B, the intervention was administered
and data were collected as part of a required laboratory
component of the mechanics course, as at University A.
Multiple lecture sections, taught by different instructors,
fed into the laboratory. At University C, the intervention
was administered via a sequence of clicker questions and
data were collected from three lecture sections of the
course, taught by three different instructors in the same
academic term. In two of those sections, administration
of the intervention was identical to one another; therefore,
data from those sections have been combined (referred to as
Section I). In the remaining section, referred to as
Section II, students were only given the stage 1 intervention
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FIG. 7. 25th–75th percentile of incoming math SAT scores
from the three populations, relative to national values. University
A is the primary implementation site.

prior to the post-test. In all courses, instructors used
research-based, active learning strategies to various
degrees. The sample sizes from University B, University
C (Section I), and University C (Section 2) were N ¼ 125,
N ¼ 230, and N ¼ 104, respectively.
Prior to the intervention, logistic regression of data from
Universities B and C revealed that a correct response to the
block question was necessary, but not sufficient, for a correct
response to the magnet question. CRT score, however, was
not a predictor for success on the magnet question. Thus, at
all three universities, outcome 1 (predicted by our theoretical
framework) was documented prior to the intervention,
suggesting that, at this stage, students did not yet possess
mindware that was sufficiently robust to support consistency
checking between their default response and the normative
mindware or to resolve such inconsistencies.
After the complete intervention (University B and
University C, Section 1), logistic regression models indicated that the probability of success on the post-test
depended on both mindware (as measured by the variable
Any_point_magnet) and the tendency toward cognitive
reflection (as measured by the CRT); these findings were
thus consistent with those from the primary implementation
site (University A), and were illustrative of outcome 2
predicted by our theoretical framework. Our results suggest
that the full intervention sequence supported students in
developing sufficiently robust mindware to help them
recognize and resolve the inconsistency between their
default response and the normative mindware—provided
they have a stronger tendency toward cognitive reflection
(i.e., a high CRT score).
It is particularly important to note that no such dependence on CRT score was observed for students from
University C Section 2, who only participated in stage 1
of the intervention (not stages 2 and 3). For these students,
performance on the post-test was much weaker than that
observed with the other student populations in this study
(in fact, no significant improvement in performance
was observed between the intervention stage 1 and the
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post-test). More importantly, the post-test performance of
these students was solely linked to mindware (as was
observed for all student populations on the pretest),
suggesting that, in the absence of the complete intervention
sequence, many students did not develop sufficiently robust
mindware. Indeed, since stages 2 and 3 were not part of
instruction, the second aspect of the necessary mindware,
which is related to Newton’s 2nd law as a criterion for
checking for consistency, was not addressed. While these
students did apply Newton’s 2nd law in a variety of
situations during course instruction, without explicit opportunities to recognize and practice the application of
Newton’s 2nd law for consistency checking (i.e., as a
criterion against which to check their default model), these
students continued to misapply a learned heuristic even
after all instruction was complete.
Collectively, these results reveal that the phenomena we
documented at the primary investigation site (University A)
are, in fact, more universal and are not idiosyncratic to one
particular population or experiment. Our findings also
underscore the importance of attending to the development
of coherent mindware that enables students to both (i) apply
this mindware in order to build a correct model or argument
and (ii) apply this mindware strategically for consistency
checking. The latter plays an integral role in the conflict
detection and sustained override associated with cognitive
reflection, which is why post-test performance was
observed to depend on both mindware and tendency toward
cognitive reflection whereas pretest performance depended
solely on mindware.
VII. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
RESEARCH-BASED CURRICULUM
DEVELOPMENT
In this investigation, the data collection, analysis, and
interpretation were all driven by the idea that two factors,
mindware and cognitive reflection, impact student reasoning on physics questions. The design of the intervention
sequence was informed by this idea, which is deeply rooted
in DPTOR. Indeed, the dual-process framework suggests
that in order to switch from a first-available, highly
compelling intuitive model to an alternative model based
on formal knowledge, students must be able to engage in
cognitive reflection so that they may detect the conflict and
successfully mediate the intuitive thinking with analytical
thinking that draws upon relevant mindware [25,48]. Our
empirical study provides evidence that both factors play a
critical role in student reasoning on a question that tends to
elicit strong, intuitively appealing incorrect responses.
Moreover, the relationships among student performance,
mindware, and cognitive reflection skills documented for a
single student population was similarly observed for two
other student populations as well.

A. Summary of findings from phase 1 analysis
Students’ pretest performance on the magnet question
differed drastically from that on the block question. We
establish that it is reasonable to treat the block question as an
adequate measure of whether or not a student possesses at
least the minimum level of mindware necessary to answer
the magnet question correctly (i.e., possessed the first aspect
of mindware as discussed in Sec. III B 2). Namely, they were
able to apply Newton’s 2nd law to balance forces acting on
an object at rest. The results of the logistic regression model
suggested that while the presence of this mindware was
linked to performance on the magnet question, cognitive
reflection skills did not appear to be a predictor of success on
that particular question. Interpreting the results through the
lens of DPTOR, we argued that the level of mindware of
those students who answered both questions correctly was
likely to be quite strong (i.e., reached the level of automaticity) so that the magnet question cued a first available
mental model consistent with a normative response. Thus,
in the absence of a conflict, the engagement of cognitive
reflection skills was not necessary. Those students who
answered the block question correctly, but failed to apply the
same mindware on the magnet question, did appear to
possess the necessary mindware; however, the strength of
that mindware may not have been sufficient to cue the
normative response. Instead, for these students, the first
available mental model (i.e., friction opposes the force by the
hand) appeared to hold strong enough intuitive appeal so that
the students either did not perceive the need to question its
validity or they missed the second aspect of mindware that
would allow them to recognize that Newton’s 2nd law must
be used as a criterion to be satisfied in order to check for
validity of the first-available intuitive response. The engagement of the cognitive reflection skills of these students,
therefore, also did not appear to be relevant and predictive of
success on the magnet pretest. These results are consistent
with outcome 1 for the interaction between mindware and
cognitive reflection predicted by DPTOR.
B. Summary of findings from phase 3 analysis
After the instructional intervention sequence, student
performance on the post-test revealed significant improvements. Data suggested that the intervention did appear to
engage some students in productive cognitive reflection.
The logistic regression model indicates that, after the
intervention, student performance on the post-test appears
to be linked to both success on the magnet question prior
to the post-test (e.g., during intervention) and cognitive
reflection skills. Indeed, even after controlling for mindware (as indicated by the prior success on the magnet
question), students with a higher level of cognitive reflection skills were more likely to answer the post-test question
correctly. These results are consistent with outcome 2 for
the interaction between mindware and cognitive reflection
suggested by DPTOR.
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C. Limitations of findings and need
for further research
It is important to note that this in-depth investigation,
though detailed in design and analysis, was conducted in
the context of a single screening-target question pair,
intervention, and closely related post-test involving the
application of Newton’s 2nd law to stationary objects (i.e.,
near transfer). We argue, however, that the design and
refinement of instructional interventions could benefit from
the kind of diagnostic assessments made possible by
applying the screening-target methodology coupled with
the CRT as a measure of the tendency toward cognitive
reflection. (See Sec. II E) This particular study presents a
case of pre-intervention results consistent with diagnostic
outcome 1 only. In our ongoing work, we have also
identified sets of screening-target pairs that, coupled with
the CRT, yield preintervention results consistent with
outcome 2 as well. While we briefly suggest specific
instructional approaches (informed by DPTOR) for such
cases in Sec. II E, an in-depth discussion of designing,
testing, and assessing efficacy of such approaches will be
the focus of future papers. In addition, given that the
reasoning phenomenon discussed in this paper is neither
limited nor unique to the topics of Newton’s 2nd law and
friction, we wish to probe whether the single intervention
presented here (or analogous interventions) will help
students successfully employ conflict detection in other,
farther removed contexts as well (i.e., far transfer). Indeed,
this is the focus of another ongoing investigation.
D. Insights into the nature of student reasoning in
physics and implications for physics instruction
On the basis of this investigation, several important
insights have emerged related to understanding, interpreting, and supporting student reasoning in the context of
physics instruction.
Intuitive processing is deeply ingrained.—Quick and
isolated fixes are not likely to produce a desirable impact on
reasoning in contexts that elicit strong, intuitively appealing
responses. Our analysis suggests that no single intervention
stage was more impactful than the rest. In fact, each stage
produced a relatively minor improvement in student performance. Moreover, even after the completion of the entire
intervention sequence, of those students who gave (or at
least agreed with) the correct answer to the magnet
questions at some point during instruction, a significant
fraction of the students (approximately one-third) reverted
back to the incorrect, intuitive reasoning on the post-test.
This finding highlights the deeply ingrained nature of
intuitive processing. Perhaps the most powerful aspects
of DPTOR are the assertions that (i) the first available
mental model serves as an entry point into any reasoning
path and (ii) process 1 cannot be turned off.
Need for instructional focus on cognitive reflection.—
Based on our findings, novices may not spontaneously
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engage in cognitive reflection on physics questions. On
the preintervention magnet question, the lack of dependence of student performance on cognitive reflection skills
(a similar result was observed on the post-test for those
students who did not complete all stages of the intervention) suggests that many students were not yet able to
recognize or act upon red flags in their reasoning, even in
the presence of the mindware required to solve the magnet
problem correctly. As such, interventions designed to help
students recognize instances of intuitive thought and to
help them develop productive approaches for mediating
such thoughts are necessary.
Need for instruction that strengthens both aspects of
mindware in order to support productive cognitive reflection and successful student reasoning.—Our results provide evidence that instruction with a primary focus on
improving one aspect of mindware, namely how to use it
as a tool for solving a specific type of problems (e.g.,
balancing forces for an object at rest), may not provide
optimal opportunities for developing productive reasoning
habits in physics and beyond. The inconsistency in student
reasoning on the block-magnet pretest (as well as post-test
performance of students in University C Section 2) suggests that the presence of this type of mindware alone is not
enough to enable students to detect red flags in their
reasoning and to mediate intuitive responses with the
formal application of necessary mindware. While
domain-specific expertise is necessarily multifaceted, the
ability to detect and mediate intuition-based responses is
an important ingredient necessary for developing expertise.
As such, designing curriculum without attending to the
second aspect of mindware, namely, how to use it as a tool
for productive conflict detection and override, is likely to be
less effective at helping students reason successfully on
many kinds of physics questions. In essence, attending to
the first aspect of mindware alone may promote the
development of heuristic reasoning (e.g., “balance forces
for an object at rest,” or “friction opposes the force by the
hand”) as opposed to helping students improve their
analytical reasoning skills (e.g., checking for consistency
and validating their responses).
How the deeply ingrained nature of intuitive processing
impacts and informs instruction.—The complex interplay
between mindware and cognitive reflection skills may
also explain why it is fairly common for students who
perform well in classroom activities (e.g., clicker questions,
group work) to be less successful on nearly identical test
problems. The decline in student performance could be
very frustrating to both the instructor and the students.
However, from our standpoint, it is an expected, unavoidable, and natural part of developing expertise in physics.
One could, in principle, argue that such a decline may be
due to suboptimal classroom instruction (or even that
“students are not trying hard enough”). However, according
to Stanovich, unless mindware has “been practiced to

020140-17

MILA KRYJEVSKAIA et al.

PHYS. REV. PHYS. EDUC. RES. 16, 020140 (2020)

automaticity” such that it “can automatically compete
with (and often immediately defeat) any alternative nonnormative response,” there is always room for error in
applying that mindware for a student who has not yet
developed the habits of mind to recognize instances of
intuitive thought and/or to trust formal knowledge enough
to override a strong intuitively appealing response [48].
In addition, experienced instructors often hear frustrated
students sharing that they studied hard and knew what
concepts were relevant to each exam question, but that they
frequently second guessed themselves (in the wrong
direction). We argue that the phenomenon of second
guessing, while frustrating to students, is a natural aspect
of learning how to reason productively. Second guessing
suggests that a student possesses an adequate level of
mindware and cognitive reflection skills to consider alternatives; however, the student has not yet developed the
habits of mind to either trust their formal knowledge or to
successfully analyze and reconcile inconsistencies between
the alternative approaches. Most reasoners who experienced the dilemma of “trusting or going against their guts”
may attest to the angst that such a dilemma presents. To
highlight this feeling of angst, we present a quote from a
student who answered a question (similar to the magnet
question used in this study) correctly after deciding against
his initial intuitive response. This student offered the
following reflection: “I applied the formal reasoning to
the best of my ability, unless I thought myself into a wrong
answer, which would look idiotic.”
We speculate that physics instruction that makes the dual
nature of human cognition explicit and visible to students
may impact student learning of physics in ways that extend
beyond improvements in student performance. For example, it may help establish an instructional environment that
emphasizes that the careful examination (and possible
rejection) of an intuitive response is a natural part of the
reasoning and not an indication of a lack of knowledge or of
any other deficiency or failure on the part of the student.
Such a reframing may also help address a common concern
that research-based materials that elicit incorrect intuitive
responses as a part of the instructional cycle may lead to
feelings of student inadequacy. Explicit discussion that
such incorrect responses stem from the dual nature of
human thinking because intuitive processing cannot be
turned off may help alleviate such concerns. Developing an
awareness of one’s own thinking paths as well as the ability
to recognize red flags is a critical step toward the development of expertise in physics, and students must be
supported throughout the instructional process to
strengthen these metacognitive skills.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this investigation, we developed, implemented, and
assessed, at three different institutions, the impact of a
single intervention sequence focused on the application of

Newton’s 2nd law to objects at rest. A family of theoretical
frameworks from cognitive science known as dual-process
theories of reasoning and decision-making informed the
design, assessment, and analysis efforts for the intervention
sequence. Indeed, drawing upon dual-process theories, we
created the intervention sequence with the aim of supporting productive reasoning by strengthening mindware
and promoting cognitive reflection. Data analysis indicated
that the intervention improved students’ mindware to the
level needed for consistency checking, an integral part of
cognitive reflection. Moreover, as expected, students’
cognitive reflection skills were shown to mediate the
success of the intervention, with those students who
demonstrated a stronger tendency toward cognitive reflection being more able to access the necessary mindware
successfully. Our findings suggest that interventions
expressly designed to support the development of mindware such that it may be used as a criterion during cognitive
reflection can help students more productively and purposefully mediate intuitive thinking (which cannot be
turned off) by reasoning more analytically. Indeed, our
analysis has shown, consistent with the findings from other
studies, that these kinds of intuitive processing errors may
occur despite strong content understanding. We argue that
it is important to help students recognize that revisiting
one’s intuitive thoughts with a critical eye is an integral
component of scientific thinking and is necessitated by the
way in which the human brain functions. Students should
thus be encouraged to view such errors as an inherent part
of the thinking process and to recognize that mindware may
also be used to test intuitive thinking. It is important to
stress that we advocate on behalf of engaging in cognitive
reflection—not simply suppressing one’s intuition. We are
confident that the coherent, theory-driven approach to
intervention design and testing illustrated in this manuscript
is an important contribution to ongoing efforts to account
for and leverage domain-general reasoning phenomena in
the learning and teaching of physics.
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APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF LOGISTIC
REGRESSIONS
We used binary logistic regression to probe the relationships among variables of interest. In a logistic regression
analysis, a model is constructed that predicts the probability
of a particular dichotomous outcome (in this study, whether
a student will respond correctly or incorrectly to a question)
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based on the value of various predictor variables (such as a
student’s score on the CRT or performance on a particular
pretest question). The predictor variables can be either
categorical or continuous. The logistic regression algorithm
fits a multiple linear regression algorithm for the log of the
odds of an event:
logðoddsÞ ¼ β0 þ β1 x1 þ    þ βn xn ;
where xn are the predictor variables and βn are regression
coefficients estimated by the algorithm. The odds of an
event are given by
odds ¼

PðYÞ
probability of event Y occuring
¼
:
1 − PðYÞ probability of event Y not occuring

It can be shown from the two equations above that the
probability PðYÞ of event Y occurring is then given by
PðYÞ ¼

1

:
1þe
For each βn , a Wald statistic is also calculated, which has
a chi-squared distribution and allows for a determination
of whether the coefficient differs significantly from zero. If
−ðβ0 þβ1 x1 þþβn xn Þ
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